Blurs, Blots and Clouds: Architecture and the Dissolution of the Surface

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Uta Barth’s Ground #2 is the photograph of a landscape. To the left we see an outcrop of wild golden grasses, while to the right the dark green of a tree rises up, its branches splaying and curving around to meet the photograph’s top edge. Beyond, the blue sea stretches out to the horizon, where it meets the hazy white of a summer sky. The photograph’s composition is conventional: it uses a tree as a framing device; it is divided into foreground, middle ground and background; and it contains familiar landscape elements – a chunk of cliff, a strip of sea, an expanse of sky. But although this photograph is recognisably a landscape, its claim to representation is subverted by the fact that the image is unquestionably out of focus. The landscape is a blur.

Ground #2 is one of a number of photographs Barth made during the 1990s that use the blurred image to question conventions of representation and perception. In the photographs comprising the two series entitled Grounds and Fields, objects are recognisable, but not clearly visible. We can identify this shape as a tree, that one as a traffic light, but none of the details is discernible. The photographs are both representational and abstract – they are at once images of everyday scenes, and abstract compositions of fields of colour. In these photographs, Barth explores the similarities between the camera lens and the human eye. Although the images’ blurred appearance results from a careful manipulation of photographic processes, the blur, Barth argues, is equally an aspect of our everyday vision. A blurred image is characteristic, for example, of peripheral vision – it results when we are not focusing directly upon an object that is within our visual field. But when we confront Barth’s blurry photographs, our instinct is to try to bring them into focus, and their resistance to that optical tendency is what gives the photographs their critical power. Barth’s photographs aim to present an image that is optically confusing. By depriving the eye of its ability to focus, or, more precisely, by forcing it to focus on an image that refuses to be brought into focus, her photographs produce a sense of visual frustration. As Barth explains: “The opticality of the image becomes even more exaggerated because you don’t see the surface, you don’t know where to stop and focus.”

Focusing, whether in the eye or in a camera lens, involves a process of lengthening and contracting, moving in and out. With their negation of the surface, Barth’s photographs give the eye nowhere to rest. The conjunction of the blurred image and the dissolved surface make the act of seeing not just confusing, but also uncomfortable. Nonetheless it is precisely by producing confusion and discomfort that Barth’s photographs focus the viewer’s attention on processes of perception, on the limitations of sight and on internalised conventions of viewing.

This article is about architecture and its role in the production of a self-aware viewing subject. It explores how colour, the blurred form, the evanescent surface and the overt display of representational techniques come together to create a mode of seeing that involves an awareness of perceptual processes – a configuration of visuality central to definitions of modernity itself.

The work of Herzog and de Meuron exhibits an ongoing preoccupation with the status of the architectural surface. In their Pfaffenhöhl Sports Centre of 1989–93, a chemical wash applied to the concrete cladding gave rise to a mottled biomorphic pattern. In the 1999 Eberswalde Library, photographic images were etched onto the glass and concrete panels of the building’s exterior in a repeating pattern. With the Eberswalde Library, Herzog and de Meuron specifically set out to challenge Adolf Loos’s characterisation of ornament as crime. For if Loos defined ornament as something negative rather than a positive process. The monochrome images do not allow for any separation between ornament and wall: the two are fused into a single entity. Both Pfaffenhöhl and Eberswalde aim to reposition the status of the architectural surface. But whereas Pfaffenhöhl chloride washes and Eberswalde etched images of clouds, ornament, the building Herzog and de Meuron completed in 2003 for an institute of contemporary dance in London – Laban – questions the relationship between architecture and colour.

Theorists who have striven to define what is essential to architecture – what makes it distinct from the other arts – have seized upon issues of structure, function, form or space. Colour, however, has never been deemed one of these essential qualities. Not only is colour a variable of other art forms, like painting, but more importantly, colour cannot itself be an essence. Whether
applied in the form of pigment, or arising from qualities particular to the material, colour is a superficial, or surface, characteristic that is dependent on our perception rather than inherent in the object itself. As a purely optical phenomenon, a sensation produced in each individual viewer, colour cannot be detached and represented. Colour, simply, is in Architectural criticism, terms such as ‘supplementary’, ‘ornamental’ or ‘cosmetic’ have been deployed to denigrate colour’s appearance in a building. As something applied to a surface, like other ornament, colour has been deemed dispensable. If ornament could be characterized by Loos as crime, colour, at best, was deception – a secondary, sensory quality, distracting and seducing the viewer and deflecting attention from what really matters about architecture. But it is precisely this power to distract and seduce that is the key to colour’s critical and destabilising potential. The beginnings of a sense of colour’s power to challenge established architectural certainties can be located historically with great precision in the debates on polychromy of the early nineteenth century. The idea that Greek temples were not originally white but painted was first advanced in France by the architect Jacques Ignace Hittorff, whose polemical paper on the Greek temple was the paradigm of architecture, the boundaries between the building and its viewers. The Greek temple was the paradigm of architecture, incorporating both architecture’s origin in the primitive bull and its ultimate perfection in the Parthenon. It had achieved that status because of its pure expression of structural concerns: even its ornaments – capitals, triglyphs, acroteria – had been interpreted as arising directly from structural considerations. Colour, in the form of applied pigments, not only disturbed the aesthetic purity of the white structure but also was an ornament with no structural origin or function. Colour was unnecessary and excessive, and the implications of the discovery of traces of pigment on Greek temples questioned the definition of architecture itself. Rather than ornamenting and reinforcing the building’s structure, colour drew attention to its surface. The notion of the decorative and ornamental for this purpose can be traced, in twentieth-century architecture, from the work of Mies van der Rohe to (most importantly for Herzog and de Meuron) the houses of Curtis House and Case Study House and Colin Apartments, all dating from 1950, providing especially important precedents. However, the specific ways colour is employed in Laban can be traced to a more general approach to the architectural surface that results in a new kind of interaction between the building and its viewers.

Laban was designed as part of a broader project for community regeneration in Deptford, an area of London known more for its industrial wasteland than its cultural monuments. Vertical bands of magenta, turquoise and lime bloom on the building’s plastic sheathing, creating the impression of a plastic skin. The coloured bands also participate in the skin’s variable transparency: once inside, users find that the panels of colour create differentiated translucent backdrops for the dance studios, library and other internal spaces, and alternately obscure and frame views of the surrounding urban context. The three colour bands achieve their greatest degree of saturation and opacity on the interior’s concrete walls, where they solidify into thick, shiny coats of neon paint. The colours of Laban’s surface are manifestly modern, industrial, artificial. In fact, it is said that their choice was inspired by the sight of an oil slick floating on the surface of Deptford Creek, an industrialised waterway running next to the site. The reflection of the building on the adjacent water seems to recall that original oil patch, and the view of Laban from a railway bridge running over the creek evokes the paintings those conjoined responses of repulsion and allure characteristic of the industrial sublime. This careful framing produces a dualistic play of surfaces. In one sense, Laban has laid waste to the Deptford area, and the engine of its renewal. Laban is a manifestly artificial object, and its engagement with the notion of artificiality is reinforced by the materiality of the building – plastic in the form of a semi-translucent twin-wall polycarbonate – and in the way colour functions as a part of that plasticised skin. In Plastic, a very short essay written in 1952, Roland Barthes locates the significance of plastic in its artificiality.2 Both awed and repelled by the potential and ubiquity of plastic, Barthes identifies it as the ultimate modern material, a material without qualities. Plastic ‘hardly exists as substance’, Barthes writes. ‘[I]ts reality is a negative one: neither hard nor deep, it must be content with a “substantial” attribute which is neutral in spite of its utilitarian advantages: resistance, a state which merely means an absence of yielding’. It is the very absence of qualities that is magical – alchemically, he writes – able to be made into any object: it is the stuff, or matter, of a parallel, man-made ‘cosmetic’ to natural substances. In the late nineteenth century of its infinite transformation [...] it is less a thing than the trace of a movement.’ The transformative potential of plastic ‘gives plastic the function of a calm, colourless, the skin reinforces its own two-dimensionality by functioning as a screen for the display of images. At night the building glows like a magic lantern, the windows become transparent and the translucent walls are transformed into a shadow-puppet theatre, making visible the students in the studio within, whose choreographed movements ornament the façade with a frieze of dancing forms. Punctuating the skin and its translucent expanse are reflective windows, arranged in an asymmetrical yet balanced pattern. These windows, in contrast to the screen-like walls, act as framed pictures. In the day, at the lower levels, the mirrored windows reflect the surrounding landscape: on one side, the industrialised waterway of Deptford Creek; to the back, the parking lot. On the front they function as a curving backdrop for an outdoor amphitheatre, providing not a stage set in traditional terms, but rather an episodic and fragmented replication of the dancers and their spectators, united in the same performative space. On the upper levels, the windows frame and reflect only the sky – a London sky with its fast-moving and ever-changing panorama of clouds. Surrounded by simple frames, and set off by the lack of reflectivity of the majority of the surface, they ornament the exterior with a series of cloud pictures. The emphasis given to Laban’s surface is complicated by the transparency of that surface, and by the fact that the structural framework is visible through the cladding. The twin-wall polycarbonate serves not only as a material, but also as a filter to appear within it, endow the material with thickness, giving the surface depth. And the fact that one can see the structural support through the material – an effect most evident at the building’s corners – sets up a tension between the building’s orthogonal structure and its evanescent outline. This sense of evanescence is heightened by the fact that the building does not have the shape of a regular geometric solid, but rather a box that seems to bend and morph, swelling delicately at the back, and blowing inward like a sail at the front. This Laban’s surface both delimits the material, a potential triggered by the variable point of view of the viewing subject.

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Four views of Laban (Herzog & de Meuron, Deptford, England, 2001)
For a number of weeks during the summer of 2002 a cloud appeared to be lingering over Lake Neuchâtel. Unlike most clouds, it stayed low, skimming the surface of the water, and unlike a fog or a mist, it did not dissipate with the heat of the midday sun. Also – most unlike a cloud – it appeared to be inhabited. People could see strolling towards it along a narrow walkway that stretched from the shore into its heart, disappearing into its depths, and emerging some time later on a parallel walkway that conducted them back to shore. This cloud was, however, no natural phenomenon, but a pavilion constructed by Diller+Scofidio for Expo 2002. Blur, as this cloud was called, consisted of a mass of vapour and a steel tensility structure that created the vapour and enabled it to cohere. The steel structure, suspended above the lake by four pylons, was made of network of hollow pipes fitted with jets. The jets pumped out a fine spray of vapour which coalesced into a cloud that shrouded the structure and created the appearance of a cloud. Within the cloud were also two platforms at different levels – one oval, the other of a biomorphic shape. Visitors, equipped with plastic raincoats, could roam the pavilion’s various levels, ascending to the ‘Angel Deck’ to take in the view, or descending to the ‘Water Deck’, where, skimming the surface of the water, and unlike a fog or a mist, it did not dissipate with the heat of the midday sun. Also – most unlike a cloud – it appeared to be inhabited: people could be seen sitting with a pupil whom he was instructing in the principles and ideas of an ingenious mind disposed to the art of designing’. 16 The linking of ephemerality and subjectivity can be traced back to an interest in exploring the fleeting nature of perception, to an aesthetic preoccupations of the eighteenth century – in particular, to the understanding of the nature of perception itself. The pavilion’s blurring of the distinctions between nature and artefact, its positing of a relationship of mutual interdependence between cloud and grid, questions the very definition of an architectural object. Architecture, in the case of Blur, could not be distilled to a mere question of structure, for the pavilion both exceeded and compromised its structural dimension, being composed of both structure and vapour, with that vapour ceiling and hiding the apprehension of the structure. Nor could Blur be understood in terms of volume: neither it had a firm outline, nor did it delineate a space. Rather than confronting viewers with an architectural object, Blur immersed them in atmosphere. Blur defined architecture not as object, nor as surface, but as pure effect. The steel structure, suspended above the lake, enabled it to cohere. It was this interplay between gridded structure and ephemeral atmosphere that changed, moved and dissolved from one moment to another. In this way, Blur pushed the idea of a pavilion – an object, rather than to an interest in the variability of perception – a cloud that was no object, but simply of a cloud; as a representation, it was used by Diller+Scofidio to represent an idea of a cloud. With Blur, the artefact of architecture was shown to be necessary to the production and representation of a natural phenomenon.

“The blot is not a drawing’, Cozens explained, ‘but an assemblage of accidental shapes, from which a drawing is to be made in a hint, or crude resemblance of the whole effect of a picture, except the keeping and colouring; that is to say, it gives an idea of the masses of light and shade, as well as of the forms, contained in a finished composition.’ 18 A blot, in other words, was not the representation of a landscape, but the expression of its effect, an effect that depended on general impressions rather than exact depiction. A blot looked like a drawing whose details were blurred or obscure. Cozen’s description brings Ut’s Barth’s photographs to mind: ‘If a finished drawing be gradually removed from the eye, its smaller parts will be less and less expressive; and when they are wholly undistinguished, and the largest parts alone remain visible, the drawing will then represent a blot, [...]. On the contrary, if a blot be placed at such a distance that the harshness of the parts should disappear, it would represent a finished drawing, but with the appearance of uncommon spirit.’ 19 A blot looked like a landscape seen indiscreetly in one’s peripheral vision, or from a great distance, or from the window of a moving vehicle, or under any other circumstances that prevented the attentive observation of its particularities. Although Blur’s absolute ephemerality seems to challenge one’s awareness that even such a seemingly stable object as a building can be more ephemeral than a building that was no object, but simply of a cloud; as a representation, it was used by Diller+Scofidio to represent an idea of a cloud. With Blur, the artefact of architecture was shown to be necessary to the production and representation of a natural phenomenon. But the building, defining it as a volume, and makes that volume appear insubstantial, mutable, almost ephemeral. The tension produced through this interplay between gridded structure and ephemeral surface is thus a tension between an impression of the building as a stable volume and as a mutable object; between a solid and a blur...
Cozens provided illustrations of 16 different types of landscape compositions, whose titles, such as ‘Groups of objects on one hand, and a flat on the other, or an irregular form next to the groups, at a moderate distance from the eye’, ‘A single or principal object, opposed to the sky, as a tree, a ruin, a rock, &c. or a group of objects’, or ‘Objects, or groups of objects, placed alternately on both hands, and gradually retiring from the eye’. The horizon above the bottom of the view, converts the abstraction and generality, the distance from detailed observation that is characteristic of his entire method. Finally, the drawing was to be completed by inserting one of the 20 sky compositions included in the treatise, which were to be chosen on the basis of considerations relating strictly to the internal logics of the composition rather than with reference to any observable configuration of the sky: Cozens noted that the artist should take care to place ‘the greatest quantity of clouds on that side of the picture where the landscape part is lowest, in order to preserve the balance of the composition’. Cozens’s method posited the blot, rather than nature, as the origin of the eventual landscape scene. But unlike Leonardo’s mouldering wall or variegated stone, Cozens’s blot is not a found object, but a created one. Before ever setting brush to paper the artist was to think of and concentrate fully on the intended subject of the work, so that the resulting blot would have ‘a general disposition of these masses, producing one comprehensive form, which may be conceived and purposely intended before the blot is begun’. Chance and accident – identified as nature’s generative principles – played a role, but just as important was the designer’s agency: ‘[] composing landscapes by invention, is not the art of imitating individual nature; it is more; it is forming artificial representations of landscape on the general principles of nature’, Cozens explained. By making the blot take the place of natural scenery as the generator of the eventual landscape composition, Cozens located the act of creation not in nature but in the artist’s mind. And by locating the origin of the composition in the mind, Cozens’s method was able to produce a dazzling degree of variety from the rudeness and uncertainty of the shapes made in blotting, one artifical blot will suggest different ideas to different persons, on which account it has the strongest tendency to enlarge the powers of invention, being more effectual to that purpose than the study of nature herself alone’. The blot’s power to generate a multiplicity of results was further demonstrated by illustrations of four different landscape compositions Cozens produced from one single blot. Cozens’s method depended on the generative potential of the indistinct, blotted form. It systematised chance and accident in order to produce an unparalleled variety of compositional solutions. But by taking chance, accident and variety – qualities associated at the time with nature’s creative processes – and putting them in the service of representation, Cozens reconfigured the relationship between nature and art. ‘[Forming artificial representations of landscape on the general principles of nature’ was doing more than simply blurring the boundaries between art and nature, it was locating perception and representation squarely within the realm of subjectivity. The self-referentiality of Cozens’s method subverted the independent existence of exterior objects, redefining them as purely mental constructs. Through Cozens’s method, nature itself was made artificial.

Cozens’s blot method is an important precursor of nineteenth-century explorations of questions pertaining to the representation of the transitory, the ephemeral, the seemingly unrepresentable – explorations that found paradigmatic expression in the depiction of clouds. Clouds, whose ‘divisions of surface are grotesque and endless […] brilliant beyond all power of colour, and transitory as a dream’, as Ruskin put it, presented a particular challenge to the artist since their instability profoundly questioned the fixity characteristic of representation. Although Cozens’s treatise contained numerous images of clouds – images that were studied and copied by Constable –, for Cozens, operate as two-dimensional, discrete compositional elements. Instead, Constable and Turner – both of whom made numerous sketches and watercolours of clouds both as studies for paintings and as works in their own right – saw clouds not as objects but as atmosphere. Clouds were variable not simply in terms of their outlines, but also because they were an integral part of a changeable, mobile skyscape.

The blot’s irregular, imprecise forms, though initially ‘rude and unmeaning, as they are formed with the swiftest hand’, were to be transformed into recognisable landscape elements such as mountains, rocks or trees by ‘studying each individual form with accidental, and the act of representation. His blots conjured up such mountains, rocks or trees by ‘studying each individual form with the swiftest hand’.

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For Ruskin, it was Turner who stood ‘more absolutely alone in this gift of cloud-drawing than in any other of his great powers’,19 a posture particularly evident in the Pools of Solomon of 1834–5. In this watercolour, Turner not only depicts a variety of ephemeral atmospheric effects but also conveys a sense of the vapour’s movement through space, with the clouds and haze hurtling towards the blue horizon and yellow glow of the sun. For Ruskin, the Pools of Solomon enabled viewers to ‘walk through the passages of mist as they melt on the one hand into those stony fragments of fiery cloud, or on the other into the cold solitary shadows that compass the sweeping hill’.20 Turner’s rendition of atmospheric effects created an unprecedented sense of space, encouraging viewers to proceed beyond the image’s surface and virtually enter into its depths. Turner’s attention to the sense of space, encouraging viewers to proceed beyond the image’s surface, demonstrated his profound understanding of what Ruskin called ‘the truth of clouds’. The Pools of Solomon exemplified this truth because its techniques were akin to the qualities of clouds themselves. Countering implied criticisms of Turner’s technique, Ruskin thundered: ‘when you find an inch without air and transparency, and a hair’s breadth without changefulness and thought, and when you can count the waves of rising radiances that go up from the sun, as you can count the fixed, white, insubilities of Claude; or when you can measure the modulation and depth of that hollow mist, as you can the florishes of the brush upon the canvas of Salvator, talk of Turner’s want of truth!’21 Like a cloud, the Pools of Solomon was transparent, changeable and extensive; like a cloud, it resisted measurement, quantification and fixation; and like a cloud, it posed questions central to the act of representation. Reinforcing the sense of aerial transparency, turbulence and motion are the pools of the title: the three rectangular basins that step down towards the distant horizon. The pools reflect the aerial turbulence on an earthly plane, the calm of the water’s surface both replicating and contrasting with the extreme mobility of the sky above. They function as subsidiary and multiple frames within the frame of the picture. And in this framing and reflecting the sky, they are representations of a representation, bringing this tension between ephemeralism and depiction, mobility and fixity, to centre stage.

Turner’s Pools of Solomon is not only a painting about clouds, it is also a painting about painting. It is a sustained exploration of the representational technique known as aerial or atmospheric perspective; that variant of perspective that relates to conveying a sense of recession and depth, but attempts to impose rules comparable to those governing linear perspective. In its attention to atmosphere – one could almost say phenomenon – Turner’s rendition of atmospheric effects created an unprecedented sense of space; – whereas, with all the old landscape painters except Claude, you may indeed go a long way before you come to the sky, for Ruskin, it is Turner who stood ‘more absolutely alone in this gift of cloud-drawing than in any other of his great powers’. In its representation of atmosphere, Turner’s Pools of Solomon demonstrated that Turner used ‘a concentric system of circles of this kind, and thus lighted’. For Ruskin, it is the curvilinear system which allows the mobility and changeability of the atmosphere to be expressed. In the paintings of the Old Masters, he writes, ‘cloud is cloud, and blue is blue, and no kind of connection between them is ever hinted at. The sky is thought of as a clear, high, material dome, the clouds as separate bodies suspended beneath it; and in consequence, however delicate a history painting be, or in tone their skies may be, you always look at them, not through them. But, he continued, ‘if you look intently at the pure blue of a serene sky, you will see that there is a variety and encompassing motion so characteristic of clouds. Instead, he argued, the curvature present in most cloud systems necessitates the employment of a curvilinear system – his analytical sketch of the sky in the Pools of Solomon demonstrates that Turner used ‘a concentric system of circles of this kind, and thus lighted’. For Ruskin, it is the curvilinear system which allows the mobility and changeability of the atmosphere to be expressed. In the paintings of the Old Masters, he writes, ‘cloud is cloud, and blue is blue, and no kind of connection between them is ever hinted at. The sky is thought of as a clear, high, material dome, the clouds as separate bodies suspended beneath it; and in consequence, however delicate a history painting be, or in tone their skies may be, you always look at them, not through them. But, he continued, ‘if you look intently at the pure blue of a serene sky, you will see that there is a variety and encompassing motion so characteristic of clouds. Instead, he argued, the curvature present in most cloud systems necessitates the employment of a curvilinear system – his analytical sketch of the sky in the Pools of Solomon demonstrates that Turner used ‘a concentric system of circles of this kind, and thus lighted’. For Ruskin, it is the curvilinear system which allows the mobility and changeability of the atmosphere to be expressed. In the paintings of the Old Masters, he writes, ‘cloud is cloud, and blue is blue, and no kind of connection between them is ever hinted at. The sky is thought of as a clear, high, material dome, the clouds as separate bodies suspended beneath it; and in consequence, however delicate a history painting be, or in tone their skies may be, you always look at them, not through them. But, he continued, ‘if you look intently at the pure blue of a serene sky, you will see that there is a variety and encompassing motion so characteristic of clouds. Instead, he argued, the curvature present in most cloud systems necessitates the employment of a curvilinear system – his analytical sketch of the sky in the Pools of Solomon demonstrates that Turner used ‘a concentric system of circles of this kind, and thus lighted’. For Ruskin, it is the curvilinear system which allows the mobility and changeability of the atmosphere to be expressed. In the paintings of the Old Masters, he writes, ‘cloud is cloud, and blue is blue, and no kind of connection between them is ever hinted at. The sky is thought of as a clear, high, material dome, the clouds as separate bodies suspended beneath it; and in consequence, however delicate a history painting be, or in tone their skies may be, you always look at them, not through them. But, he continued, ‘if you look intently at the pure blue of a serene sky, you will see that there is a variety and encompassing motion so characteristic of clouds. Instead, he argued, the curvature present in most cloud systems necessitates the employment of a curvilinear system – his analytical sketch of the sky in the Pools of Solomon demonstrates that Turner used ‘a concentric system of circles of this kind, and thus lighted’.
The development of a technique designed to express the atmosphere’s ephemeral quality is important not only in itself but also because it epitomized modern painting. In his chapter on modern landscape painting, Ruskin noted that when ‘we turn our eyes [...] to the most characteristic scenes of modern landscape [...] the first thing that will strike us, or that ought to strike us, is their *conditions*.’ Modern viewers were ‘expected to rejoice in darkness, and triumph in mutability; to lay the foundation of happiness in things which momentarily change or fade; and to expect the utmost satisfaction and instruction from what it is impossible to arrest, and difficult to comprehend.’ For Ruskin, ephemeralism was not just a feature of clouds, but emblematic of a modern condition of viewing. The modern viewer was a subject who could not see objects distinctly because objects were no longer understood as discrete entities but as indeterminate forms, or suggestive blurs, without clear outlines or surfaces. Attention to atmosphere defined the discrete entities but as indeterminate forms, or suggestive blurs, without clear outlines or surfaces. Attention to atmosphere defined


5 Hubert Damisch instead asserts that Ruskin’s attempt to reconcile perspective with the opposition the scientific geometrical and abstract infinite [...] and a pictorial and expressive depiction of the ephemerality of clouds demonstrates ‘the extent to which Ruskin (if not John Ruskin, Analytical sketch of the sky in Turner’s Plate of Solomon, from Modern Painters (Keston, 1888), vol. VI, figure 80.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p. 261.


11 See, for example, the classic ‘Reconstructions’ essay: Michael Craig-Martin: Surfacing (London, 1992), pp. 9–26.


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21 Ibid., vol. VII, p. 129.


26 Ibid., vol. VII, p. 128.

27 Ibid., vol. VII, p. 129.


31 Ibid., vol. VII, p. 129.


34 Ireland, p. 207.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., p. 74.

38 Ibid., p. 8.


40 Ibid., vol. V, p. 120.

41 Ibid., vol. V, p. 121.


45 See, for example, the classic ‘Reconstructions’ essay: Michael Craig-Martin: Surfacing (London, 1992), pp. 9–26.